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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

CYCALONA GOWEN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 2:08-CV-01581-RCJ-RJJ

VS.

TILTWARE, LLC, FULL TILT POKER, POCKET KINGS LTD., KOLYMA CORPORATION, RAYMOND BITAR, an individual, HOWARD LEDERER, an individual, ANDREW BLOCH, an individual, PHILLIP IVEY, an individual, CHRISTOPHER FERGUSON, an individual, JOHN JUANDA, an individual, PHILLIP GORDON, an individual, ERICK LINDGREN, an individual, ERIK SEIDEL, an individual, JENNIFER HARMAN-TRANIELLO, an individual, MICHAEL MATUSOW, an individual, ALLEN CUNNINGHAM, an individual, GUS HANSEN, an individual, and PATRICK ANTONIOUS, an individual,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT UNDER FRCP RULE 12(b)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF AND UNDER FRCP RULE 9(c) FOR LACK OF PARTICULARITY

Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants Tiltware, LLC ("Tiltware"), Raymond Bitar, Howard Lederer, Andrew Bloch, Phillip Ivey, Christopher Ferguson, John Juanda, Phillip Gordon, Erick Lindgren, Erik Seidel, Jennifer Harman-Traniello, Michael Matusow, Allen Cunningham, Gus Hansen and Patrick Antonious (the "Individual Defendants") by and through their counsel of record from the law firms of OLSON, CANNON, GORMLEY & DESRUISSEAUX and GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP and move to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 12(b)(6), and Rule 9(c) plaintiff Cycalona Gowen's Complaint for: 1. Breach of Contract; 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 3. Breach

of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 4. Unjust Enrichment; and 5. Fraud.

This motion will be based on the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the complaint and other pleadings filed in this action, and such other argument and evidence which may be presented at the hearing on this motion.

DATED this day of January, 2009.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Cycalona Gowen, a self-described celebrity poker player, has launched a typhoon of litigation, particularly against 13 of her fellow professional tournament poker players, claiming she was promised a 1% ownership interest in Tiltware, LLC and the Full Tilt Poker brand name and website. Ms. Gowen may, or may not, be able to make a claim for breach of an oral contract, but she certainly does not have a shotgun claim for fraud against her thirteen fellow poker pros, or a "minority oppression," or breach of fiduciary duty claim against the individual defendants.

The Court should dismiss Ms. Gowen's complaint, or at the very least order her to significantly clean up her almost random claims against the multiple defendants. In particular, the Court, unless Ms. Gown makes an offer of proof sufficient to satisfy this Court, should dismiss the thirteen individual defendants -- who she indiscriminately sued individually due to Ms. Gowen's apparent litigation "strategy," their notoriety in the poker world, and Ms. Gowen's thirst for publicity -- with prejudice.

THE PARTIES

A. <u>Plaintiff Cycalona Gowen.</u>

Plaintiff Cycalona Gowen ("Gowen" or "Plaintiff") claims she is a 1% shareholder in defendant Tiltware LLC, <u>and</u> any of its parent, subsidiary or affiliated companies. Complaint, ¶ 26. Among these "Companies," plaintiff lists "FTP" or "Full Tilt Poker" which, however, is not a separate legal entity but a well-known brand name in the poker world.

B. Defendant Tiltware, LLC.

Defendant Tiltware LLC ("Tiltware") is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of California. Complaint, ¶ 3. Tiltware was incorporated in 2003. Complaint, ¶ 27.

Tiltware is a software and licensing company which develops and provides software,

¹ Ms. Gowen has apparently not served two other foreign defendants Pocket Kings Ltd. of Ireland and Kolyma Corporation of Aruba, neither of which is appearing by this motion.

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development and consulting services to "FTP" or Full Tilt Poker. Complaint, ¶ 28.

Defendant Raymond Bitar.

Defendant Raymond Bitar is one of Tiltware's original "managers/members." Complaint, ¶ 3. Mr. Bitar is also the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, a director and a shareholder of Tiltware, as well as allegedly the other "closely affiliated" Companies. Complaint, ¶ 32, 33.

4. The Other Thirteen Defendant Poker Professionals.

Thirteen of the other individual defendants are professional poker players, peers so to speak of Ms. Gowen's, and allegedly directors and shareholders/members of Tiltware and purportedly the other Companies: Howard Lederer, Andrew Bloch, Phillip Ivey, Christopher Ferguson, John Juanda, Phillip Gordon, Erick Lindgren, Erik Seidel, Jennifer Harman-Traniello, Michael Matusow, Allen Cunningham, Gus Hansen and Patrick Antonious (the "Full Tilt Players".)² Complaint, ¶ 34-46.³

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS TO ALL DEFENDANTS, AND CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL "FULL TILT POKER" TEAM -- NONE OF WH CONTRACT WITH MS. GOWEN.

Ms. Gowen's first claim for relief for breach of contract should be dismissed. The breach of contract claim, as plead in the complaint is, to put it mildly, fairly simple.

In the "Allegations Common To All Causes Of Action" in the Complaint, Ms. Gowen first alleges:

"57. Because Plaintiff was a well-known professional poker player, in April 2004, Bitar offered Plaintiff a 1% ownership interest in FTP and Tiltware in exchange for Plaintiff to become a celebrity representative for FTP ("Agreement").

² Defense counsel accepted service of process on Tiltware and other thirteen Individual Defendants.

³ Ms. Gowen's allegation that all of the other individual defendants are allegedly shareholders of Tiltware is erroneous.

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58. Plaintiff accepted Bitar's offer to become a 1% owner of Tiltware and FTP, and became part of what FTP called "Team Full Tilt" which consisted of Defendants Lederer, Bloch, Ivey, Ferguson, Juanda, Gordon, Lindgren and Seidel, who all had ownership interests in Tiltware and FTP."

In the body of her "first cause of action," Ms. Gowen incorporates by reference paragraphs 57 and 58, and then essentially repeats:

"79. In April 2004, the parties entered into the Agreement, wherein Plaintiff was given a 1% ownership interest in the Companies in exchange for Plaintiff for [sic] representing the FTP Brand as a celebrity poker player.

80. Defendants breached the Agreement with Plaintiff by failing and refusing to perform in good faith their promise to pay Plaintiff for work performed."

Plaintiff contends that she was not properly paid for her services from 2004 to 2008, and she estimates that the value of Tiltware and the other "Companies" is in excess of \$4,000,000,000.4 Therefore, Ms. Gowen's claim for a 1% ownership interest totals "no less than \$40,000,000." Complaint, ¶ 73, 83.

Plaintiff's complaint and claim for breach of contract, however, suffers from some fundamental pleading deficiencies. One, plaintiff has not even alleged whether the contract is supposedly oral or written or implied-in-fact (or Tiltware might as well say now, "made-up"). Two, the "terms" of the agreement, to put it mildly, are alleged rather sparsely, and indeed appear illusory. Even under the liberal federal court "notice pleading" standards, the Court should dismiss plaintiff's current bare-bones complaint and require Ms. Gowen to file a more informative pleading that complies with simple due process requirements when a person is suing 18 separate defendants.

In any event, and assuming that the Court allows Ms. Gowen leave to file an amended complaint against at least Tiltware, Ms. Gowen's claim is unalterably exactly that -- a contract

⁴ The Court should not regard this as a typo: Ms. Gowen claims literally ¶ 73 that she values Tiltware at \$4 billion.

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claim between Ms. Gowen and Tiltware alone. None of the other thirteen individual defendants are parties to that alleged agreement. The other thirteen defendants are indeed alleged to be nothing more than co-members or shareholders of Tiltware and, as such, cannot be liable as a matter of law for breach of a contract that Tiltware, not the individuals, allegedly entered into and allegedly breached. The thirteen individual defendants should all be dismissed -- and with prejudice, unless Ms. Gowen makes an offer of proof satisfactory to the Court to grant her leave to amend against the individual defendants.

II.

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR "BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY -- MINORITY OPPRESSION ACTION" SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

Plaintiff's second claim for relief is labeled "Breach Of Fiduciary Duty (Against All Individual Defendants - Minority Oppression Action)." This claim should be dismissed for three fundamental reasons. One, plaintiff seeks to present a rather novel legal theory, contrary to well-established corporate law, that according to plaintiff there are no protections for an entity doing business as a corporation or limited liability company because all shareholders or members purportedly owe a fiduciary duty to the other shareholders or members, including an affirmative duty of full disclosure.5

Second, the thirteen individual defendants appear to again be included in this breach of fiduciary duty claim for tactical reasons unrelated to their alleged conduct vis-à-vis Ms. Gowen. In short, there was no fiduciary relationship, and there is no breach of any fiduciary duty alleged in the complaint.

Third, and in any event, Ms. Gowen has certainly not made her breach of fiduciary duty claims with the required specificity or particularity against any of the individual defendants -even giving plaintiff the benefit of the doubt under the broad notice pleading rules. The second

⁵ Defendants acknowledge that there are certainly some circumstances where majority shareholders owe minority shareholders obligations to treat them fairly and not "squeeze" them out. See Giles v. Gen Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying Nevada law); Clark v. Lubritz, 113 Nev. 1089, 944 P.2d 861, 866-67 (1997). Ms. Gowen, however, has barely pled a breach of contract claim, and certainly not any facts to support a "Minority Oppression Action."

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claim for relief should be dismissed, and unless a sufficient offer of proof is made, it should also be dismissed with prejudice.

III.

PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

Since the thirteen individual defendants should not be parties to the contract claims, they should obviously also not be part of, and dismissed from, the bad faith claim.

The rightfully ever-shrinking tort for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing usually requires a special element, in addition to a garden variety breach contract claim, e.g., some tortuous reliance, intolerable misconduct, or breach of a fiduciary duty. Extra-contractual tort liability and tort remedies are limited to "rare and exceptional cases." Great American Insurance Co. v. General Builders, Inc., 113 Nev. 346, 934 P.2d 257, 263 (1997). The Nevada Supreme Court has pointed out that contractual bad faith claims are limited to situations where "the party is in the superior and trusted position," and has engaged in "grievous and perfidious misconduct." K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 49, 732 P.2d 1364, 1371 (1987). This requirement of a special relationship between the tortfeasor and the tort victim, coupled with egregious misconduct, generally limits these type of non-contractual "bad faith" tort claims to special relationships like employment, bailment, insurance, or partnership agreements.

Here, if Ms. Gowen has a contract claim for 1% of the ownership or stock of Tiltware (which she values at no less than \$40 million), it seems that her remedy, assuming she prevails, will be quite adequate. There are no special circumstances or special relationship to turn this commercial contract dispute into a tort action. The bad faith claim should also be dismissed.

IV.

PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT TES THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM AND SHO DISMISSED.

Ms. Gowen again indiscriminately pleads her fourth claim for relief for unjust enrichment against "All Defendants." For that reason alone, it should be dismissed as to "All Defendants" including the thirteen individual poker pro defendants she strategically decided to sue.

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In addition, an action based on the theory of unjust enrichment or quasi-contract is not available when there is an express, written contract, because no agreement can be implied when there is already an alleged express agreement. Leasepartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust Dated November 12, 1975, 113 Nev. 747, 755, 942 P.2d 182, 187 (1997) (citing Lipshie v. Tracy <u>Investment Co.</u>, 93 Nev. 370, 379, 566 P.2d 819, 824 (1977) ("To permit recovery by quasi-contract where a written agreement exists would constitute a subversion of contractual principles.") The Nevada Supreme Court has observed that the essential elements for unjust enrichment "are a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, appreciation by the defendant of such benefit, and acceptance and attention by the defendant of such benefit." Union America Mtg. v. McDonald, 97 Nev. 210, 212, 626 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1981). None of these elements are properly alleged here.

Ms. Gowen certainly cannot state a claim for unjust enrichment or quasi-contract against the thirteen individual defendants and they should be dismissed with prejudice. Ms. Gowen is suing Tiltware for breach of an allegedly express oral contract, which sounds at this point more like a relatively simple contract or employment dispute with Tiltware and its CEO Raymond Bitar, so her unjust enrichment claim should also be dismissed.

V.

PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR "FRAUD MISREPRESENTATION" SHOULD ALSO BE DISMISSED.

Plaintiff's fraud claim is particularly ambiguous and apparently two-fold. First, she alleges that Tiltware's CEO Raymond Bitar in April 2004 contacted her at her home in Texas and offered a 1% ownership interest in exchange for her agreeing to represent the Full Tilt Poker brand. Complaint, ¶ 108. Mr. Bitar engaged in a single conversation with plaintiff more generally described at ¶ 109-112 of the complaint. It is difficult to determine how any of those conversations amount to intentional misrepresentations or fraud.

According to Ms. Gowen, Mr. Bitar told her that he wanted her to play in an upcoming World Series of Poker Event and represent the Full Tilt Poker brand -- and she apparently did so. Ms. Gowen, according to her complaint, also asked Mr. Bitar to prepare a written contract "memorializing" the alleged oral agreement regarding plaintiff's 1% ownership interest -- which

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Mr. Bitar tellingly did not do. The parties thus apparently have a commercial dispute regarding whether there was an oral contract and, if so, its terms, and whether Tiltware (or perhaps Ms. Gowen) breached the contract. This is not a fraud case; it is a breach of contract case.

Second, plaintiff contends that she attended a meeting one month later in May 2004 with at least some, i.e., a "majority," of the thirteen individual defendants in attendance. According to the complaint, Defendant Howard Lederer conducted the meeting and explained that ownership interests were not only in Full Tilt Poker, but also in Tiltware which was exclusively providing the software to Full Tilt Poker at a high licensing fee. Complaint, ¶ 113-114.

According to Ms. Gowen, these alleged statements by Mr. Lederer somehow also constitute an intentional misrepresentation and fraud. She further alleges at ¶ 123 in a totally conclusory manner that each of the statements set forth in paragraphs 107 through 114 were "false," because Tiltware and each and every of the thirteen individual defendants -- only one of which, Mr. Lederer, apparently even spoke at the meeting -- had no intention at the time in May 2004 of giving Plaintiff a 1% ownership interest in the "Companies" as allegedly agreed upon by Mr. Bitar, not Mr. Lederer, a month earlier in April in 2004.

Defendants, and particularly the thirteen individual defendants, not surprisingly do not believe that plaintiff has fulfilled her pleading obligations under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b) that fraud "shall be stated with particularity." The individual defendants do not, and cannot, know the alleged facts and reasons that they have been sued by Ms. Gowen for fraud or any kind of disloyalty or breach of fiduciary duty.

Ms. Gowen's shotgun pleading against Tiltware, and each of the thirteen individual defendants, is a classic example of why the Ninth Circuit, and all federal courts, require a heightened pleading standard for fraud, i.e., the alleged perpetrator of the forever defamatory "fraud" allegation is entitled to know "the who, what, where, when, and how" of the alleged fraud, so that defendants who are sued for fraud are given appropriate notice of their particular alleged misconduct so they can defend against the charge, and not just deny that they have done anything wrong. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).

FRCP Rule 9(c) requires the allegation of specific facts concerning the alleged fraud.

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These particular facts include the time, place, persons, the specific alleged mis-statements, and an explanation as to how the alleged statements were false or misleading. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig. 42 F. 3rd 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994 (en banc)).

In other words, "the plaintiff must set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false about a statement, and why it is false." Vess, supra, 317 F.3d at 1107. "Fraud" is an easily stated allegation, but certainly never to be treated lightly, and not indiscriminately alleged to join thirteen individual defendants into a corporate breach of contract action.

Here, only Tiltware and its CEO Mr. Bitar can possibly know from the complaint that Ms. Gowen contends that Mr. Bitar entered into an oral, never documented, agreement that she would become a 1% owner of Tiltware. The other defendants, however, have no way of knowing or understanding from Ms. Gowen's shotgun complaint how her apparently relatively simple breach of oral contract claim has morphed into claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment against them as individuals with potential tort and punitive damages implications.

The court should dismiss the fraud claims against all of the defendants, and require Ms. Gowen to state her fraud (and other claims) with sufficient particularity so that each of the 18 individually named defendants can understand and appropriately test Ms. Gowen's commercial claims at the pleading stage.

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CONCLUSION

The Court should grant this motion to dismiss, and order Ms. Gowen to file a pleading sufficiently particular to put the appropriate defendants, including the thirteen "celebrity" poker professional defendants she has tactically chosen to sue, on notice individually of her multiple "fraud" and other claims. Indeed, the thirteen individual defendants should as a matter of law be dismissed with prejudice unless Ms. Gowen provides a sufficient offer of proof to this Court that she can state a claim for relief against the individuals. This is plainly a disputed breach of "oral" contract case between business people, and not a fraud, fiduciary duty or tort claim against individual defendants.

DATED this ____ day of January, 2009.

OLSON, CANNON, GORMLEY & DESRUISSEAUX

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